Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
WISP 2014 Proceedings

Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and
Privacy (SIGSEC)

Winter 12-13-2014

Assessment Instrument for Privacy Policy Content:
Design and Evaluation of PPC
Tobias Dehling
Department of Information Systems, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany., dehling@wiso.uni-koeln.de

Fangjian Gao
Department of Information Systems, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany., gao@wiso.uni-koeln.de

Ali Sunyaev
Department of Information Systems, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany., sunyaev@wiso.uni-koeln.de

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/wisp2014
Recommended Citation
Dehling, Tobias; Gao, Fangjian; and Sunyaev, Ali, "Assessment Instrument for Privacy Policy Content: Design and Evaluation of PPC"
(2014). WISP 2014 Proceedings. 2.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/wisp2014/2

This material is brought to you by the Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy (SIGSEC) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has
been accepted for inclusion in WISP 2014 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please
contact elibrary@aisnet.org.

Dehling et al.

Design and Evaluation of PPC

Assessment Instrument for Privacy Policy Content:
Design and Evaluation of PPC

Tobias Dehling
University of Cologne, Germany
Fangjian Gao
University of Cologne, Germany
Ali Sunyaev1
University of Cologne, Germany
ABSTRACT
Privacy policies are notices posted by providers and intended to inform users about privacy
practices. However, extant research shows that privacy policies are often of poor quality and do not
address users’ concerns. In this paper, we design and develop PPC – a privacy policy content
assessment instrument to support assessments of whether offered privacy policy content provides
comprehensive information addressing users’ privacy concerns. PPC is developed based on extant
research, standards, and guidelines. Application of PPC to 62 privacy policies of mHealth apps
available in iOS and Android demonstrates utility of PPC and suitability of PPC as assessment
instrument for privacy policy content. Contributions of our research are twofold: For research, we
conduct improvement design science research contributing to design theory on assessment of
privacy policy content. For practice, potential applications of PPC are support in privacy policy
development and identification of deficiencies in offered privacy policies. In addition, through
evaluation of PPC, we reveal an insufficient current state of mHealth app privacy policy content.
Keywords: information security, information privacy, privacy policy, privacy practices, privacy
policy content, P3P, mHealth, health IT
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INTRODUCTION
Today’s online environment consists of a multitude of offerings that present information to
users, consume user information, process user information, and tailor presented information
according to user characteristics and preferences. Users are concerned with privacy issues related to
IT offerings and want to control access to their information (Khalid et al. 2014). Without support,
users cannot be expected to gauge fit of IT offerings with their preferences and expectations,
especially, when it comes to complex concepts like privacy.
For the scope of this paper, we adapt the tripartite model of privacy introduced by Tavani
and Moor (2001), which consists of a concept of privacy, management of privacy, and justification
for privacy. In addition, we focus only on information privacy (Clarke 1999) and not on other facets
of privacy (e.g., physical privacy). Privacy is conceptualized as protection from intrusion and
restricted access to information (Tavani 2007; Tavani and Moor 2001). Privacy is managed through
external control (e.g., enforcement of laws) and individual control (e.g., choice, consent, and
correction). 2 Justification for privacy is that leakage of sensitive, personal information, or risk
thereof, can cause harm to users (Dehling et al. 2014; Rindfleisch 1997). A central principle for
establishing privacy in online contexts is the publicity principle: “Rules and conditions governing
private situations should be clear and known to the persons affected by them”(Moor 1997, p. 32). If
providers do not obey the publicity principle, users cannot know providers privacy practices and are
thus prevented from managing their privacy through individual control: Without knowledge of
privacy practices, users can obviously neither exert choice, consent, nor correction in a meaningful
way.
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See Tavani and Moor (2001) for a detailed discussion.
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Privacy policies are notices provided by providers and a common tool to inform users on
privacy practices. However, extant research shows that privacy policies are often of poor quality
and do not address users’ needs: Privacy policies are often unspecific, do not provide the
information users are looking for (Earp et al. 2005), and do not address a common selection of
content aspects (McDonald et al. 2009). Providers seem to freely choose which aspects to address
and which to leave out (Sunyaev et al. 2014). If privacy policies do not offer content covering the
information users are looking for, they cannot attain there objective of informing users about
privacy practices. Consequently, users are unlikely to be able to exert individual control or to
manage their privacy (Tavani 2007). An instrument for assessment of privacy policy content can
guide creation of privacy policies, evaluate offered privacy policies, and alleviate the
aforementioned problems. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no detailed guidelines
for assessment of privacy policy content.
Our research aims at closing this gap through design and development of PPC – a privacy
policy content assessment instrument. PPC is designed to accomplish two goals. The first goal of
PPC is to support assessments of whether offered privacy policy content provides comprehensive
information on privacy practices. The second goal is to capture privacy practices stated in assessed
privacy policies. PPC can thus be applied to assess whether privacy policies are suitable for
enabling users to exert individual control (Tavani 2007).
We assess utility and completeness of privacy policy content aspects by applying PPC to 62
privacy policies of widely-used mobile health (mHealth) applications (apps). mHealth apps
leverage various wireless technologies to provide health-related information and services on diverse
mobile devices (Istepanian et al. 2004). Users, albeit deeming access to health information and
related services beneficial, are however concerned with information security and privacy issues
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(Khalid et al. 2014). Since information security and privacy concerns impede users’ willingness to
share information (Anderson and Agarwal 2011), they also lessen potential benefits to be reaped
from mHealth apps. Novelty and associated uncertainty of mHealth app use and the high stakes
involved, make mHealth apps an auspicious domain for research on privacy policy content. If users
were provided with the information required to gauge information security and privacy practices of
mHealth apps, they would be more likely to use mHealth apps and to share personal information in
order to benefit from enhanced offerings tailored to their needs – an important step towards
realization of the promising potential of mHealth apps to transform and improve the health care
environment (Steinhubl et al. 2013).
RESEARCH DESIGN
We followed the Design Science Research paradigm (Gregor and Hevner 2013) and
employed a two-step research approach. In the first step, we developed an artifact (i.e., PPC) for the
assessment of privacy policy content. In the second step, we evaluated utility and completeness of
PPC by applying it to 62 privacy policies of mHealth apps available in the official app stores of the
two major mobile platforms – iOS (Apple 2014) and Android (Google 2014a). The tripartite model
of privacy (Tavani 2007; Tavani and Moor 2001) was employed as kernel theory for PPC and
serves as basis and explanation for our design (Gregor and Jones 2007).
Identification of Privacy Policy Content Aspects
According to the tripartite model of privacy, privacy policies need to offer comprehensive
information addressing users’ privacy concerns. Users’ privacy concerns are however neither static
nor identical for all users: Individual and cultural differences lead to differences in privacy concerns
(Miltgen and Peyrat-Guillard 2014), while online offerings and privacy policies are globally
accessible. Privacy is moreover context-specific (Smith et al. 2011). Hence, users look for different
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information, process information differently, and act differently depending on context and
contextual clues (Lowry et al. 2012). Therefore, we sacrifice parsimony for comprehensiveness to
make the assessment of privacy policy content useful for diverse sets of users in various online
situations and contexts. Moreover, PPC leverages a hierarchical, modular structure reflecting users’
core privacy concerns: information collected, rationale for collection, handling of information, and
offered privacy controls (Ackerman et al. 1999; Antón et al. 2010; Earp et al. 2005). The
hierarchical, modular structure of PPC facilitates its adaptability to diverse research scopes and
domains, and fosters analysis of privacy policy content on different levels of detail.
The core of PPC is a catalogue of privacy policy content aspects offering information on
providers’ privacy practices. We established our catalogue of privacy policy content aspects based
on extant research, standards, and guidelines to incorporate results of different domains and
perspectives related to privacy policy content. We chose privacy policy content covered by the
platform for privacy preferences project (P3P, Cranor et al. 2006) as foundation for the content
catalogue. P3P is a framework that can be used to construct machine-readable representations of
providers’ privacy practices (Reagle and Cranor 1999). The P3P specification addresses a wide
selection of privacy policy content aspects to facilitate representation of a wide variety of privacy
practices (Lämmel and Pek 2013). However, the P3P specification does not directly offer a readyto-use list of privacy policy content aspects since it only specifies a domain-specific language for
privacy policies. Therefore, we analyzed the P3P specification to identify the privacy policy content
aspects for PPC and enriched them with additional aspects identified in extant research, standards,
and guidelines (Ackerman et al. 1999; Antón et al. 2010; Carrión et al. 2012; Council of the
European Communities 1995; Federal Trade Commission 2013; Google 2014b; Health on the Net
Foundation 2010; Milne and Culnan 2002; United States Congress 1974). Redundancies and
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missing aspects were identified and resolved through an iterative process consisting of multiple
revisions of the content aspect catalogue and group discussions of the latest version with all authors.
Once satisfied with the result, the catalogue was reviewed by two independent researchers from the
domains of medicine and law to ensure comprehensiveness and clarity. All identified ambiguities
and resulting changes were subsequently resolved and implemented.
Evaluation of PPC
Privacy policies of current mHealth apps are suffering from low quality (Sunyaev et al.
2014) and constitute thus an appropriate domain for further research on privacy policy content. We
applied PPC to privacy policy content of mHealth apps to evaluate utility of PPC and
comprehensiveness of identified privacy policy content aspects. Derived from the publicity
principle, our main testable proposition (Gregor and Jones 2007) is that PPC supports assessments
of whether offered privacy policy content is comprehensive, within the context of online IT
offerings. We conducted a naturalistic, ex-post evaluation (Venable et al. 2012) and evaluated
whether PPC can be adapted to the domain of analysis and whether mHealth app privacy policy
content can be covered with PPC’s privacy policy content aspects. The three competing goals for
evaluation in design science research are rigor, efficiency, and ethics (Venable et al. 2012). For our
evaluation, the main goals are rigor and efficiency because our evaluation involves no human
subjects and rigorous, efficient research on privacy policy content is clearly in line with the ethical
principles proposed by Myers and Venable (2014). Rigor requires establishment of efficacy and
effectiveness (Venable et al. 2012). Hence, we applied our assessment instrument to assess content
of actual privacy policies of mHealth apps. To ensure efficiency, we limited our analysis to privacy
policies of mHealth apps and conducted the evaluation mainly with two raters.
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Privacy policies were taken from the data set collected by Sunyaev et al. (2014), who
gathered English language mHealth apps in the official iOS (Apple 2014) and Android (Google
2014a) app stores, and surveyed the 600 most-frequently rated apps (iOS: 300 apps; Android: 300
apps) for privacy policies. For each app we identified the privacy policy by successively checking
the app store web site, web pages maintained by the app provider, and Google search results. Only
those privacy policies that focus on a backend application, multiple apps, or a single app were
included in the content assessment because privacy policies with a scope unrelated to the actual app
do not offer information on app-related privacy practices (Sunyaev et al. 2014).
For the content assessment, two raters independently read all privacy policies and annotated
statements matching PPC content assessment aspects or attributes with respective identifiers and
values. Results of the coding (Hruschka et al. 2004) were subsequently loaded into a database to
facilitate identification of discrepancies, inter-rater reliability assessment, and analysis of results.
Both raters started with a small random subset of privacy policies. Once finished, arising issues
were discussed and resolved, and PPC was improved if necessary. When any errors in raters’
assessment were revealed or PPC was updated, both raters started anew with assessment of all
privacy policies. With increasing rater proficiency and PPC maturity, the size of the random privacy
policy subset was increased until it encompassed all privacy policies. To ensure inter-rater
reliability, we employed Janson’s and Olsson’s ι, a multivariate extension of Cohen’s κ for multiple
judges on the same scale (Janson and Olsson 2001). Differences, ambiguities, and other issues
identified during application of PPC were resolved through group discussions with all authors
followed by a revision of PPC, if necessary.
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RESULTS
Artifact Description
With pre-defined privacy policy content aspects, PPC enables users to assess whether a
privacy policy offers comprehensive content addressing users’ privacy concerns. To improve ease
of use, structure content aspects to be assessed, and facilitate adaptability, PPC orders privacy
policy content assessments aspects hierarchically. Figure 1 presents a schematic representation of
PPC. The top-tier consists of abstract, high-level content aspects. Four top-tier content aspects
Information Collected, Rationale for Collection, Handling of Information, and Offered Privacy
Controls represent main user concerns (Ackerman et al. 1999; Antón et al. 2010; Earp et al. 2005)
and the fifth top-tier aspect Meta Information is not directly related to the privacy policy content
and mainly required for execution of the assessment and representation of additional information.
Application of PPC requires each rater to assess 121 content assessment aspects per privacy policy.
The top-tier is further refined in disjunct sub-tiers consisting of further content aspects with
similar abstraction level, which refine top-tier content aspects with respect to level of detail.
Analogously, sub-tiers group related content aspects in further, more detailed sub-tiers. The bottomtier content aspects have consequently the narrowest focus and the highest level of detail in
comparison to higher tiers. The hierarchical layout and disjunct grouping of content aspects ensures
adaptability by allowing for arbitrary addition/removal of content aspects on any tier if necessary
and refinement of content aspects to any desired level of detail.
Information Collected is refined through three tier-2 content assessment aspects: Type
represents assessments of what information is collected (e.g., Identification). Sensors represents
assessments of how information is collected. Sensors collect for instance information on the user
Location (e.g., GPS Location). Feature-Specific Information Collection represents an assessment
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META INFORMATION
Rater

Provider Type

Focus

Reading Grade Level
Attribute: Scope

URI

Retrieval Date

Standard Compliance

Text

Language

Character- / Word Count

· Single App

· All Developer Services · Backend Web App

· Multiple App

· Not App Related

· Provider Homepage

INFORMATION COLLECTED
Type
·
·
·
·
·

Communications
Interaction; Location
Navigation; Purchases
Online Contacts
Session Details

Identification
·
·
·
·

Sensors
Attribute: Collected

Operational

·
·
·
·
·

Always; Never
Opt-In; Opt-Out
Not-Now
Not-Addressed
Not-Collected

User Details

Government-Identifier
Online Contact
Physical Contact
Unique Identifier

·
·
·
·
·

Demographics
Finances, Health
Ideological
Preferences
User Device

Supported
External
Sensors

Location

·
·
·
·
·

· GPS Location
· Network Location
· WiFi Environment

Always; Never
Opt-In; Opt-Out
Not-Now
Not-Addressed
Not-Collected

Device

Environment

User

·
·
·
·

·
·
·
·

· Clock
· Fingerprint
· ePayments

Battery
Flashlight
Speaker
Vibrator

Feature-Specific
Information Collection

Attribute: Collected

Bluetooth Environn.
Bluetooth Transfer
Camera
Microphone

Attribute: Collecting-Modules
·
·
·
·

Addressed
Not-Addressed
Only-Modules-Collecting
Only-Modules-Not-Collecting

RATIONALE FOR COLLECTION
Attribute: Collected
·
·
·
·
·
·
·

Always
Never
Opt-In
Opt-Out
Not-Now
Not-Addressed
Not-Collected

Personalization
·
·
·
·
·
·

Offered Services
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·

Pseudo Analysis
Pseudo Decision
Individual Analysis
Individual Decision
Tailoring
Customization

Operation
·
·
·
·

In-App Ads
Marketing
Payment
Physical Delivery
News
Search
Survey
Health

Public Welfare
·
·
·
·

Core Functionality
Administration
Development
Legal

Technical Details

Arts
Education
Historical
Government

Communication
· User Communication
· Contact; Feedback

· Account; Login
· Session Management

HANDLING OF INFORMATION
Attribute: Protection
·
·
·
·
·

Same
Not-lower
Recipients
Unspecified
Not-Addressed

Attribute: Collected
·
·
·
·
·

Always; Never
Opt-In; Opt-Out
Not-Now
Not-Addressed
Not-Collected

Security Measures

Retention

Recipients
Government

Business Practices

Other Users

Legal Requirement

User Authorized

Stated Purposes

Unrelated
Advertiser

User Preference

Attribute: Employed

Authorization

Always; Never
Opt-In; Opt-Out
Not-Now
Not-Addressed
Not-Collected

Redundancy

No Retention

Regular Audits

·
·
·
·

Backup
Password

Cookies
Local
Provider

Attribute: Collected
·
·
·
·
·

Always; Never
Opt-In; Opt-Out
Not-Now
Not-Addressed
Not-Collected

· Processing
· Storage
· Transfer

Write Access
User

Attribute: Collected
·
·
·
·
·

Other Users
Provider

Third Party

Other User Device

Employed
Partially-Employed
Not-Employed
Not-Addressed

Encryption

Storage
Cloud

Delivery
Public

·
·
·
·
·

Indefinitely

Provider

Analyst

Attribute: Collected

Always; Never
Opt-In; Opt-Out
Not-Now
Not-Addressed
Not-Collected

OFFERED PRIVACY CONTROLS

Access Audit
Attribute: Collected
·
·
·
·
·

Always; Never
Opt-In; Opt-Out
Not-Now
Not-Addressed
Not-Collected

Breach Notification
No Notification
User Obligation

·
·
·
·

Correct
Money
Law
No Remedy

· Addressed
· Partially-Addressed
· Not-Addressed

Nature of Breach
Occurrence of Breach

Dispute Remedy

Attribute: Addressed

· Addressed
· Partially-Addressed
· Not-Addressed

·
·
·
·
·

On-Next-Access
User-Notified-By-Mail
Mail-And-Next-Access
No-Notification
Not-Addressed

Remedial Steps Taken

Privacy Policy Limits
Attribute: Addressed

User Access

Change Notification
Attribute: Notification

Dispute Resolution
·
·
·
·
·

Customer Service
Applicable Law
Independent Organization
Court
No Resolution

Attribute: Access
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·

View
· View+Delete
Download
· View+Download
Delete
· View+Correct
Pseudo-Delete · Not-Addressed
No-Access
View+Correct+Download
View+Delete+Download
View+Correct+Delete
View+Correct+Delete+Download

Information Contributed by User
Information Collected by App
Information Collected by Third Party

Figure 1: Schematic representation of P2C. (Continuous boxes represent assessment aspects and
dashed boxes represent attributes.)
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whether privacy policies outline what information is/is not collected by which features. Consider
the following example: Users might want to use an application that offers medication information
and can also tailor presented information to users’ information stored in a personal health record
(PHR). In such a case, it would be helpful for users if the privacy policy outlined whether PHR
access is mandatory or whether the application can also be used for plain information retrieval
without tailoring.
Rationale for Collection is refined through six tier-2 content assessment aspects: Operation
represents operational purposes for which information is collected (e.g., application Administration).
Personalization represents assessments of stated reasons for collecting information to personalize
the application (e.g., employment of Pseudo Analysis for general personalization through analysis
of aggregated user behavior). Communication aggregates content assessments of whether a privacy
policy states that information is collected to facilitate communication (e.g., communication between
users (User Communication)). Offered Services refers to assessments of instances where realization
of offered services is stated as purpose for information collection (e.g., processing of Payments).
The two remaining tier-2 content assessment aspects record cases where Technical Details (e.g.,
Session Management) or Public Welfare (e.g., secondary use for Educational purposes) are given as
rationale for information collection.
Handling of Information is refined through five tier-2 content assessment aspects:
Recipients represents stated information sharing practices (e.g., if user-entered information is shared
with Other Users). Retention is comprised of content assessment aspects of stated information
retention practices (e.g., retention according to Legal Requirements). The content assessment aspect
Security Measures records statements regarding measures taken to ensure information security.
Assessments regarding Security Measures remain however quite general (e.g., use of Backup
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mechanism) since technical implementation details, like the actual algorithms implemented, are not
very meaningful to end-users. Storage groups content assessment aspects focusing on where
information is stored (e.g., in the Cloud). Write Access captures statements regarding who can insert,
update, and delete user-entered information (e.g., the User).
Offered Privacy Controls is refined through seven tier-2 content assessment aspects: Access
Audit captures whether users are offered means for reviewing at which time who assessed what
parts of their information. Breach Notification records statements regarding notifications in case of
privacy infringements (e.g., when the breach occurred (Occurrence of Breach)). Change
Notification represents statements concerned with how users will be informed about modifications
of the privacy policy (e.g., whether Users are Notified-by-Mail). Dispute Resolution and Dispute
Remedy reflect statements on offered courses of action for resolving disputes regarding the privacy
policies (e.g., through an Independent Organization) and remedies offered for justified user
objections (e.g., Monetary remedies). Privacy Policy Limits captures whether the privacy policy
addresses its boundaries like entities covered by the targeted privacy policy. User Access groups
content assessment aspects of how users can access information collected on them (e.g.,
Information Collected by the Application).
To capture more detailed information and stated privacy practices, content assessment
aspects are assigned attributes, as applicable. Attributes are basically sets of more detailed
assessments or of possible manifestations of privacy practices. Figure 1 depicts all used attributes in
dashed boxes, possible values they can be set to, and the content assessment aspects to which they
are assigned. In total eight different attributes are used to facilitate more detailed assessments of
how content aspects are addressed. Three attributes (Addressed, Collecting Modules, and Scope) are
used for more detailed assessments of privacy policies content aspects, beyond binary assessments
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of addressed/not-addressed. The remaining five attributes (Access, Collected, Employed,
Notification, and Protection) capture stated privacy practices. Access is, for instance, assigned to
the User Access sub-content aspects and records the permissions (e.g., view, correct, delete, and/or
download) users have for accessing information contributed by them, collected by the provider, or
collected by a third party (e.g., an advertising network). Collected is the most frequently used
attribute and captures whether information collection or a certain privacy practice is mandatory,
optional, or not performed. Multiple attributes can be assigned to a single content aspect. The subcontent assessment aspects of Recipients (e.g., Advertiser or Public) are, for instance, assigned the
attributes Collected and Protection. Protection assesses how information is protected by data
recipients: A third party receiving information can, for example, be bound by the same privacy
policy as the provider, their own privacy policy (recipients), or an own privacy policy that does not
yield lower protection than the providers’ privacy policy (not-lower).
Evaluation of PPC
We evaluate PPC’s utility and comprehensiveness through application to 62 privacy policies
of most-frequently rated mHealth apps. With a score of ι=0.94, inter-rater reliability assessment
with Janson’s and Olsson’s ι leads to an “almost perfect”(Landis and Koch 1977) agreement. The
content assessment shows that content provided in all assessed mHealth app privacy policies can be
covered by content aspects of PPC. This indicates a high degree of comprehensiveness of PPC’s
privacy policy content aspects and implies that PPC is a suitable assessment instrument for
comprehensiveness of privacy policy content.
Our assessment results reveal that privacy policies of mHealth apps are in a bad state of
health and unlikely to provide sufficient information addressing privacy concerns. Due to page
limitations, we can only give a short overview of our assessment results. The 62 privacy policies
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fail to address many content aspects. While the high-level top tier content assessment aspects
insinuate coverage of content aspects in over 85% of assessed privacy policies, deficiencies of
mHealth app privacy policy content are revealed through traversal of the content assessment aspect
hierarchy. For instance, some content aspects, like Sensors, Write Access, and Dispute Resolution,
are only addressed by less than a fifth of discovered privacy policies. Furthermore, no privacy
policy addresses whether users are enabled to audit accesses to their information (Access Audit),
whether and how they are informed about breaches of privacy (Breach Notification), or what
remedies are offered to rectify or compensate for justified user objections (Dispute Remedy). A
further major deficiency is that privacy policies only seldom state what practices are not
implemented and what information is not collected so that users’ are left in uncertainty with respect
to the unaddressed aspects. In short, current privacy policies of mHealth apps are unsuitable to
achieve their objective of informing users about privacy practices.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
PPC is an assessment instrument that supports holistic, comprehensive, and structured
assessments of privacy policy content. Application of PPC to assess privacy policy content of 62
mHealth apps shows utility of PPC and demonstrates comprehensiveness of PPC’s privacy policy
content aspects. In terms of the eight components of the design theory specification framework by
Gregor and Jones (2007), PPC contributes to design theory on assessment of privacy policy content
as follows: PPC focuses on the information offered by privacy policy content, other aspects like
comprehensibility are beyond the scope of PPC. The main constructs employed are statements,
content assessment aspects, attributes and privacy practices. Privacy policies consist of statements
that convey privacy practices carried out by the respective information system or its provider.
Content assessment aspects capture the results of assessments. Attributes are employed, as
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applicable, to refine content assessment aspects and capture manifestations of privacy practices.
Principles of form and function are characterized by the hierarchical and modular design of PPC.
Top-level content assessment aspects are refined through more detailed, disjunct lower-level
content aspects. Thus, analysis of content assessments aspects on the top-levels offers an overview
of assessment results and allows for identification of results warranting more detailed attention.
Subsequently, results can be explored in more detail through traversal of the hierarchy.
Consideration of artifact mutability is reflected in the hierarchical design allowing for flexibility
and adaption of PPC to individual research scopes and domains as well as to incorporate content
assessment aspects reflecting relevant technologies, techniques, or threats to privacy emerging in
the future. The kernel theory guiding PPC design is the tripartite model of privacy introduced by
Tavani and Moor (2001). Accordingly, the main testable proposition is that PPC supports
assessments of privacy policy content comprehensiveness in the context of online IT offerings. We
test this proposition by demonstrating PPC’s utility and sufficiency as assessment instrument
through application of PPC to privacy policies of mHealth apps.
Practical contributions of PPC design and development are support of privacy policy
development and identification of deficiencies in offered privacy policies. With respect to users,
PPC aids in selecting those offerings that fit users’ information privacy needs and preferences by
facilitating comparisons of individual privacy policies and stated privacy practices: User
organizations or users themselves could apply PPC to privacy policies of IT offerings and establish
a repository of privacy policy content assessments allowing for comparisons of privacy practices
between alternative IT offerings. In addition, through application and evaluation of PPC, we reveal
an insufficient current state of mHealth app privacy policy content. This finding highlights the need
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for future research and improvement of offered privacy policy content so that privacy policies
actually make privacy practices transparent.
In order to sufficiently reduce privacy-related user concerns through privacy policies,
content offered in privacy policies must comprehensively offer the information users are looking
for. The multifarious, context-dependent nature of privacy makes identification, provision, and
assessment of comprehensive privacy policy content a challenging task. PPC addresses this issue,
builds on extant research, achieves flexibility and adaptability through a modular, hierarchical
design, and constitutes an assessment instrument for privacy policy content. PPC facilitates
assessments for privacy policy content and is thus useful for supporting and guiding future efforts
towards provision of comprehensive privacy policies that are actually of use to users.
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